


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Gendering MBW activation – tensions and ambiguities - lone parents and partnered women in EU

Inequality, policy differentiation and variegated policy

- Jobless households and child poverty - maximise employment participation in households with children
- Ireland prioritised activation and conditionality for lone parents while 'partners' remain a weak 'medium term' objective
- What explains this resistance and how does it compare to other 'strong' MBR's



Source: Eurostat 2010 Tables from website. Base = persons aged 0 to 59.


Daly (2011) - policy ambiguity - family and labour market policy often pull in different directions

Policy also ambiguous between women and differentiates in treatment of lone parents and coupled parents (Plantenga et al 2013, Korpi et al 2014)

10% decline in lone parents to 74,000 (2014) WAQA's (working age partners) tripled 2007-14

| | 2007 | 2007 | 2014 | 2014 |
|--|----------------|---|----------------|---|
| <i>Payment category</i> | <i>QAs</i> | <i>Children in households with QA payment</i> | <i>QAs</i> | <i>Children in households with QA payment</i> |
| Working age income supports (incl JSA and JSB) | 26,688 | 68,747 | 80,029 | 226,339 |
| In-work payments | 6149 | 14,256 | 17,093 | 29,463 |
| Illness, disability and caring payments | 25,925 | 33,997 | 24,883 | 38,892 |
| Contributory and non contributory pensions | 67,275 | 3154 | 72,185 | 12,769 |
| Total | 126,037 | 120,154 | 194,190 | 307,463 |

Most vulnerable families?



Male breadwinner activation – JST?

Voluntary Registration, Eligibility, 12yrs

Table 2. Levels of differentiated conditionality for lone parents and partners.

| | <i>Lone parent with child under 7</i> | <i>Lone parent with child 7–13</i> | <i>Lone parent with child 14+</i> | <i>Primary JA claimant, QA and child 0–21 (in full time education)</i> |
|---|---|--|---|--|
| | <i>One parent family payment</i> | <i>Job seeker’s transitional, child 7–14</i> | <i>Job Seekers Allowance</i> | |
| Is woman* required to be available for work? | No | No | Yes | No |
| Is woman required to genuinely seek work? | No | No | Yes | No |
| Does woman have access to active labour market programmes and supports? | No | Yes | Yes | No |

Pathways to Work 2016-2020

Two main objectives.

1. Continue and consolidate the progress made to date with an initial focus on working with unemployed jobseekers, in particular people who are long-term unemployed.
2. Extend the approach of activation to other people who, although not classified as unemployed jobseekers, have the potential and the desire to play a more active role in the labour force.

Enabling

Compensation

Regulation

Not clear whether qualified adult 'expansion' will be incentive or sanction based

Facilitate individualised access to payment – increases live register

Mechanism to bring QA into JST, but not clear if this will remain voluntary

Bring in 'part-time' or softer forms of conditionality into JST

Drivers




Table 2.1 Work tests for lone parents in selected OECD countries

| No work test | Work test Independent of child age (applied at discretion of case managers and subject to childcare availability) | Work test Dependent on child age (age limit in years) (range of state variations in Canada and the US) |
|---------------------|--|---|
| Portugal Spain | Belgium – discretion Denmark – subject to childcare Finland Japan – discretion Netherlands – increased to five from 2009 Sweden | Ireland – 18 or 22 if child in full-time education New Zealand – 16 United Kingdom – from 16 to seven by 2010 Australia – from 16 to seven in 2006 Luxembourg – six Canada – 0.5 to six Czech Republic – four Austria – about three France – three Germany – three Norway – three Switzerland – three United States – 0.25 to one |

Source: OECD (2007) *Babies and Bosses – Policies towards reconciling work and family life, a Synthesis of Findings for OECD Countries*. Paris: OECD, updated from Table 4.6, p.88.

How does this compare to partnered spouses ... the lost days

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- *MISSOP*
- *OECD Family Data Base*
- *ILO*
- *Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (SaMip)* and the
- *Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)*.

- INGOLD Thesis 2010 P 35 nothing exists
- Key word searches difficult - 'partners'
- Tells us a lot – 'the invisible woman'

Direct literature

- Ingold, J and D Etherinton (2014). Partnered women (UK, Aust, Denmark),
- UK – Ingold (2011)
- Denmark 300 hours rule Bach, H. B. & Larsen, B. (2008), Kvist, J., Pedersen, L. & Köhler, P. A. (2008)
- Australian, Alexander, M., Baxter, J., Hughes, J. & Renda, J. (2005)
- German Hartz IV, Lietzmann 2014, Leschke & Jepsen 2014
- US Povich, Roberts and Mather 2014 Kingfisher and GoldSmith 2001
- NZ Kingfisher and GoldSmith 2001

Various pathways

- Australia *Working Nation* (1994) and subsequent reforms targeted at lone and partnered parents receiving Parenting Payment (PP) required partnered women to claim in own right : *Australians Working Together* (2003) and *Welfare to Work* (2006) conditionality for partners
- Denmark the 300 hours rule (*300 timers reglen*) introduced in 2006 for married couples claiming social assistance (means-tested) benefit, in the context of Danish 'activation' policies since 1994
- USA WFTC working families incentives 1990's

Research Design:

- Comparing 4 relatively strong EU male breadwinner regime's transitions (or not) to modified MBR or specialised dual earner
- Ireland and Czech Republic v UK (England and Scotland) and Germany (East and West)
- Hunch: Intersection of **gender regime and activation regime**
- Not advocating shift - more interested in resistance and why: controversial, equality of levelling down,
- Controversial: Trading individualisation and economic independence with care recognition and choice

| | | UK (England) | UK (Scot) | Germany E | Germany W | Czech republic | Ireland |
|------------------------------------|--|--------------------|--|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--|
| LP's | | Obliged aged 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 14 |
| Partners | | Obliged | <i>Voluntary Working for Families Activation support</i> | Obliged | Obliged | Refamilisation voluntary | Voluntary, no activation support |
| Activation Soft/weak | | Workfare | Social inclusion | Workfare | Workfare | Social Inclusion | Work first and active inclusion |
| Capacity | | Strong, privatised | Strong NGO's | Stronger work norms | Weak implementation | Capacity issues | Capacity issues |
| Politics and Vetoes and governance | | Centre Right | Devolution | Lander | Lander | SD/CD - societal choice | Women in the home veto |

(Tentative) Conclusions

- Lone parents everywhere must ‘Work like a man – Care like a woman’..... some partners can still be ‘mothers and wives’
- Activation - regime and capacity,
- Gender Regime - vetos and norms
- Ambiguous and contradictory
- EU C.S.R. and ideational promotion of adult worker – uneven impact ..
- Not an argument for levelling down
- Women and low pay
- Jaeherling et al, Keck and Sarcaeno - Given movement into low paid part time work no evidence that activating low income partners or lone parents achieves positive outcomes for women or children, level up for lone parents.....

3 Changing norms

- Motherhood, paid work and parenting ...rationality mistake (Duncan and Irwin 2004)
- Primarily mother, primarily worker, mother/worker integral
- Presence of partners little difference ... but class, ethnicity and sexuality
- Moral negotiation in post modernity – decisions are relational but also non negotiable pre – givensdifferent processes for LP's and partners
- Dean 2001 working parenthood and parental obligation women being pressed to exchange familial dependency for economic exploitation but attitudes accept both members of cohabitating couple should work,
- Men's changing norms (Youngjoo and Thébaud 2009, Schober and Scottt ,2012, Chesley 2014)
- MacLeavy (2011) adults in low income households assume dual roles to meet stricter conditions for financial support

1 Activation and de-segmentation of working age social security towards triple integration (Clasen and Clegg 2011)

Table 2. Triple Integration in Contemporary Labour Market Policy

| Process of integration | Possible policy implications |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| Unemployment benefit homogenization | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fewer tiers of unemployment protection • Emergence of dominant tier of unemployment provision • Diminishing differences between benefit tiers |
| Risk re-categorization | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diminishing differences in entitlement and conditionality between unemployment and other benefit schemes • Transferring claimants to unemployment benefit systems • Merging benefit programs • Creating a single benefit for working-age people |
| Activation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Merging employment services (active LMP) and unemployment benefit provision (passive LMP) • Tightening requirements to engage in supported job-search • Providing labor market advice and support systems for unemployed and other working-age benefit groups ('one stop shops') |

2 Male breadwinner to.....

- Gender regime /male breadwinner regimeCrompton 1999.
- Daly's (2011) rejects adult worker regime for specialised gender dual worker regime to explain ambiguous and contradictory ways different women experience specialised tax system, family policy, working time and activation or work conditions
- Misra, J., Moller, S. and M. Budig. 2007 distinguish partnered and single women
- Keck and Saraceno (2013) – policies are part of a more complex institutional and cultural framework of options and constraints that shape the labour market participation of mothers
- Daly (2011) encouraging if not compelling employment for all claimants, workless households and mothers in the home as well as elimination of housewife bonus by individualising taxation (except France Germany Ireland)
- Greater but not full equality seems more feasible , status of parent important and electorally salient (Plantenga 2014 31)
- Partnered mothers (PM's) in social assistance programmes increasingly a target for paid work but more through incentives than sanctions but numbers of PM's exempt from work obligations declining (UK, Aust, NZ, Germany, Denmark, US) (Ingold 2011) .

Germany

- Germany in particular, which for a long time has focused on the breadwinner model, family and reconciliation policies has 'reconsidered' away from an arrangement where mothers are the sole care workers
- **2005** Germany Hartz IV specific target in the new system of basic income support—the unemployment benefit II (UB II)—the main focus is on individuals' efforts to gain employmentbut weakly implemented
- Kopf and Sabel (2014) treatment of partners in German Hartz IV – labour market participation obligations albeit conditional on childcare and case worker discretion oriented towards male claimant
- Kopf and Cordula Zabel (2013) case managers in WG replicate, rather than challenge, the previous division of labour but in EG Germany do not accept that former homemaker's be exempted from activation programmes
- Convergence but marked differentiation east and west and still ambivalent relationship between the activation paradigm and household responsibilities for mothers (Lietzmann 2014)

UK

- UK new Deal for Partners 1999, Partners Outreach for Ethnic Minority (POEM) Pilot (Aston, J., Bellis, A., Munro, M., Pillai, R. & Willison, R. (2009)
- UK Joint Claims **2001** - Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) reform aimed to target partners of main benefit claimants who, as a group, had previously been remote from the public employment service. (Arrowsmith 2004, Bewley, Dorsett and Thomas 2005)
- 2008 extension of JSA joint claims to couples with children,
- (Collard, S., & Atkinson, A. (2009)) Partners decision making
- 2008 WFTC (MacLeavy 2011), Universal Credit removes specific income disregard for secondary earners (Oxfam 2010, Ingold 2010, Rubery 2015 6)
- UK, Schober P and Scott J (2012), DWP evaluations (var) , Ingold (2011, DWP) ,
- Scotland voluntary 'working for families' (McQuaid et al 2013, McQuaid et al. 2009, 2006).

Czech Republic (Eva Mitchell)

- CEEC “re-familialised” - responsibility to support a family unit has been transferred from the state back to the families,
- Strong MBR long maternity leave (beyond 2yrs), cancelled if child placed in state-funded kindergarten, a 20% drop in net income if parents share leave , main breadwinner loses entitlement to spousal tax credit once their partner’s earnings reach a certain level.
- Little triple integration or integration - growing segregation (Nelson 2013)
- The Czech case also reveals **limited reform, in theory** activation of partners. (Sirovátka and O’Hora, but Pathways to Work for Lone Parents’ aged 4 in 2010)
- Weak activation model and poor implementation, very selective in searching for those policies compatible with their preferences. (Sirovátka 2010)

Ireland

- Activation laggard (Murphy 2014)
- Lone parent up to 21 if child in FTE until to 2012, lowest in Europe
- 2012 – partial activation LP if youngest child 7-14 and full conditionality LP over 14
- No conditionality for partners even if no care obligation – attachment to ‘wifely labour’ - ‘you would get women in their 40’s doing training courses’
- No research, data, policy or academic